University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

Spring 2008

Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone
Awry
Wendy G. Gerzog
University of Baltimore School of Law, wgerzog@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, Taxation-Federal Estate
and Gift Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone Awry, 61 Tax Law. 775 (2008)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Valuation Discounting Techniques:
Terms Gone Awry
WENDY C. GERZOG*
A discussion of valuation for transfer tax purposes l almost always begins with
the estate tax regulation defining fair market value as "the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts."2 Then, the scholar, litigant, or court describes
equivalent values in money or money's worth. Most of the time, this definition has been a perfectly good one, but the definition as applied has gotten
out of control.
Thus, just as a regulation creates a rule, it should also create exceptions
to that rule when the terms of the definition are not used in their normal
sense. Specifically, when the seller is defined as someone who is seeking the
lowest price for her product, fair market value needs a different definition to
deal with the distortion created from the misuse of that term. Otherwise, we
are in the land of Orwellian anti-logic where $100,000 in cash becomes the
equivalent of $60,000.
Regulations in the income tax loss context can serve as a model for exceptions to a general rule. There are two Regulations that deny losses for intentional destruction of property values. 3 They can serve as models for Treasury
to refine the fair market value definition to conform to a more realistic and
public policy supported meaning of value when terms in the general definition
are twisted, muddled, and misapplied.

*Professor, University of Baltimore, School of Law. I would like to thank all the tax professors
at the Law and Society meeting in Montreal (May 2008), especially Professors Linda M. Beale,
Neil H. Buchanan, Jeffrey A. Cooper, Joseph M. Dodge, Jonathan B. Forman, and Brian D.
Galle, who gave me very helpful comments on this anicle.
ITransfer taxes include gift, estate, and generation skipping transfer taxes. 1.R.c. Chapters
11, 12, and 13.
2Reg. § 20.2031-1(b). See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) ("The
willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is nearly as old as the federal income, estate,
and gifts taxes themselves, and is not challenged here."); Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner, 507
F.3d 1317, 1321 (lIth Cir. 2007); Estate of True v. Commissioner, 390 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th
Cir. 2004); Smith ex rei. Estate of Smith v. United States, 391 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 2004);
Eyler v. Commissioner, 88 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1996); First Nat'l Bank v. United States,
763 F.2d 891,893 (7th Cir. 1985).
3Set Reg. § 1.165-3 (denial of loss for propeny acquired with the intention of demolition); Reg. § 1.165-7 (denial of casualty loss for willful or gross negligence in an automobile
accident).
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I. The Fair Market Value Definition
Courts have interpreted the hypothetical players in the fair market value definition Regulation to be reasonable individuals who are motivated by economic
factors. 4 That is, "[i) t is well-settled that the willing buyer-willing seller test is
an objective one, requiring that potential transactions be analyzed from the
viewpoint of a hypothetical seller whose only goal is to maximize his profit on
the sale of his interest."5 Moreover, just as courts have held that they "may not
permit the positing of transactions which are unlikely and plainly contrary to
the economic interest of a hypothetical buyer,"6 that reasoning should also be
applied to hypothetical sellers who act contrary to their economic interests. 7
Likewise, that hypothetical standard is defined as incorporating a real sale:
"[b]y its very definition, this contemplates the consummation of the purchase
and sale of the property ...."8
The fair market value standard incorporates a hypothetical seller and buyer
primarily to promote certainty by applying objective criteria to determine
valuation. 9 Employing hypothetical actors is "supported by the theory that the
estate tax is an excise tax on the transfer of property at death and accordingly
that the valuation is to be made as of the moment of death ...."10
While the hypothetical sale is frozen at the valuation date, courts have urged
that "common sense" be applied to valuation. 11 In Estate of Curry v. United

'1elke, 507 E3d at 1321 n.ll (citing Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.e. 193,218 (1990))
("The buyer and seller are hypothetical, not actual persons, and each is a rational economic
actor; that is, each seeks to maximize his advantage in the context of the market that exists on
the valuation date."); Estate ofJameson v. Commissioner, 267 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir. 2001);
Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1428 (7th Cir. 1983); Estate of Kahn v. Commissioner, 125 T.e. 227, 231 (2005).
5Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 483,486 (1 Ith Cir. 1987).
6Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Estate of Curry, 706
F.2d at 1428-29.
7Estate of McClatchy v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998) ("However,
the 'willing buyer willing seller' method posits not only a hypothetical buyer, but also a hypothetical seller.").
8Dunn v. Commissioner, 301 F.3d 339, 353 (5th Cir. 2002).
9Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1988); Propstra
v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1251, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Defining fair market value with
reference to hypothetical willing-buyers and willing-sellers provides an objective standard by
which to measure value. The use of an objective standard avoids the uncertainties that would
otherwise be inherent if valuation methods artempted to account for the likelihood that estates,
legatees, or heirs would sell their interests together with others who hold undivided interests in
the property. Executors will not have to make delicate inquiries into the feelings, artitudes, and
anticipated behavior of those holding undivided interests in the property in question. Without an explicit directive from Congress we cannot require executors to make such inquiries.")
(citation omitted).
I°Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981).
IIUnited States v. CartWright, 411 U.S. 546,551 (1973) ("Respondent's argument has the
dear ring of common sense to it."); seea/so Oettmeier v. United States, 708 F. Supp. 1307, 1314
(M.D. Ga. 1989) (valuation ofleased timberland).
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States, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that common sense together
with the buyer's goal of maximizing her position are reasons that voting and
non-voting stock in a closely held company should be aggregated for valuation
purposes under the hypothetical fair market standard in the Regulations. J2
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit in Estate ofCurry refused to consider manipulations in valuation, such as "the hypothetical bifurcation of an otherwise
integrated bundle of property for valuation purposes," that would distort and
reduce the decedent's estate tax liability.13
While a hypothetical buyer would take into consideration partnership form
limitations created either by the partnership agreement or by local law, a hypothetical seller would not try to discount the value of her assets by transferring
them to a limited partnership form to minimize the value of her property in
preparation for a sale to that hypothetical buyer. That is, a seller, who by definition has a profit motive for her actions, would not create a family limited
partnership (FLP) with cash, cash equivalents, marketable securities, or other
liquid assets or some combination because to do so would be to reduce the
value of her property to a great extent without any, or without any sufficient,
economic reason.
One of the main principles of valuation is to value an asset at its "highest
and best use" rather than at its actual use. 14 Exceptions to this rule are few and
specifically defined by statute. 15 "The fair market value of property is a reflec-

12706 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1983) ("It is well established that the willing buyerwilling seller rule presumes that the potential transaction is to be analyzed from the viewpoint
of a hypothetical buyer whose only goal is to maximize his advantage. And it does not comport
with common sense that a willing buyer would be likely to purchase non-voting shares in a
small, family-held business, without concomitantly purchasing a controlling voting interest.
Such a purchase would put the outside purchaser at the mercy of the voting insiders on matters such as dividend declaration and other important corporate policies, without affording,
as in the case of most publicly-traded corporate stock, a ready 'exit' remedy of disposing of
the purchased stock, or the 'voice' remedy of joining with voting non-insiders to protect the
minority interest. In applying the willing buyer-willing seller rule, courts may not permit the
positing of transactions which are unlikely and plainly contrary to the economic interest of a
hypothetical buyer as a basis for the valuation. Thus, even apart from considerations of estate
tax policy, there is logical reason to reject the estate's proposed separate fair market valuation of
voting and non-voting stock.") (citation omitted).
13Id. at 1438. Such behavior, the court stated would encourage "an executor to invent
elaborate scenarios of disaggregated disposition in order to minimize total value. For example,
an estate in possession of all shares of a corporation, voting and non-voting, could, under the
regime urged by the estate here, arbitrarily slice the voting share block so thinly as to deny
attribution of a control premium to any resulting block." Id.
14LeFever v. Commissioner, 100 F.3d 778, 782 (lOth Cir. 1996) ("The estate tax under
section 2001 is generally based on the fair market value of the taxable property, valued at its
highest and best use.") (citation omirted).
15For example, section 2032A was enacted to prevent the disappearance of the family farm.
Estate of Hudgins v. Commissioner, 57 F.3d 1393, 1396-97 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Courts have
recognized that, in enacting § 2032A, Congress sought to provide relief to those who, when
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, NO.3
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tion of the 'highest and best use' of the property on the date of valuation."16
That ultimate use is "a reasonable and probable use that supports the highest
present value as defined as of the effective date of appraisal."17 In Thornton v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court elaborated:
We agree with petitioners that in determining the value of property on a
given date a potential highest and best use for the property can be considered even though the potential use is prohibited on the valuation date by
some restriction in a deed, statute or roning Regulation .... However, the
projected highest and best use must have a strong possibility of achievement.
In other words, it should not be remote, speculative or conjectural. IS

Since the likelihood of immediate gift giving or dissolving the partnership
after the decedent's death is great,19 valuing the underlying assets of an FLP

inheriting family farms, might otherwise be forced to sell them to pay estate taxes calculated
on 'highest and best use' values, which often exceed significantly the land's value for farming
purposes. In the hope of avoiding such a result and helping to preserve family farms and other
closely held businesses, Congress allows qualifYing property to be returned for estate tax purposes at its actual (farm) use value rather than its fair market value based on its highest and best
use. As permission to elect' this so-called 'special use valuation' constitutes an act of grace or a
special dispensation by Congress, the courts have strictly construed § 2032A and its requirements.") (citations omined); Whalen v. United States, 826 E2d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1987).
16McMurray v. Commissioner, 985 E2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1993); Estate of Juden v.
Commissioner, 865 E2d 960,963 (8th Cir. 1989).
17McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 108 (1991).
18 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 395, 1988 T.C.M. (RIA) , 88,479, aff'd in an unpublished opinion,
908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The court proceeded to explain how it
would value that interest: "We also agree that in such a case the proper approach is to value
the property at its highest and best use even though its highest and best use is prohibited at
the date of valuation by the applicable restriction then to proceed to reduce or discount such
value by a reasonable estimate of the cost of removing the restriction and for the time needed to
accomplish such removal." Id. at 41-42. Because the transferor voluntarily imposed restrictions
of the FLP form, this article would deny a reduction in value to reflect the costs of liquidating
the partnership.
190ften immediately after FLP formation, parents begin transferring FLP shares to their children as gifts at a discounted value. See, e.g., Martha Brinon Eller, Which Estates Are Afficted by
the Estate Tax?: An Examination ofthe Filing Populationfor Year-of Death 2001,25 Stat. Income
Bull. 185, 192 (Summer 2005), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2893/
is_l_25/ai_nI5756730 ("In these family limited partnerships (FLP's), which may hold a variety
of assets, including common stock, real estate, and cash or cash equivalents, parents typically
retain only a small general partnership interest and slowly give limited partnership interests to
their children through lifetime gifts-using the annual exclusion available under the Federal gift
tax--or bequests. For the parent who is a general partner, the primary goal of this arrangement
is to reduce the wealth that will eventually be included in his or her estate or the estate of any
surviving spouse."); ANGELA SCHNEEMAN, THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 80 (3d ed. 2002) ("Most often, the family limited partnership is established
by individuals who are concerned about protecting their assets and transferring them to their
children with the least amount of income and estate tax liability .... The parents then gift
their children with interests in the limited partnership as limited partners."); Larry D. Hause,
Is a Family Limited Partnership Right For You? (1996), hnp:llwww.fredlaw.comlarticleslrax/
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, NO.3
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makes the most sense. Thus, just as a decedent cannot give her estate the special use valuation benefits of section 2032A,20 by converting real estate into
farm land that does not satisfy the requirements of that section, a seller who
creates an FLP should not be able to convert liquid assets into illiquid ones to
reduce the value of his gifts or of his estate.
With respect to gift tax valuation, the Fifth Circuit in Citizens Bank 6Trust Company v. Commissioner hypothesized that a donor could legitimately
reduce the value of his gift of artwork by painting a mustache on it. 21 The
court stated, as is currently the state of the law, that
[t}he same result as in our Mona Lisa case would follow in a case where the
owners placed restrictions on their stock by agreement and the restrictions
took effect before a transfer that was subject to gift or estate tax. In both
types of case the reduction in value would have occurred before the gift was
made. 22

The court minimized the abuse impact of such a contrivance by contending
that that kind of estate planning would be costly and, hence, self-limiting. 23

taJc9606_ldh.html ("Through a Family Limited Partnership, parents can begin to shift wealth
to their children .... The parents are able to give more assets away each year, shifting wealth
out of the estate."); Donald H. Kelley, David A. Ludtke, and Burnell E. Steinmeyer, Jr., 1 EsT.
PlAN. FOR FARMERS AND RANCHERS § 7:28. Form for Client Explanation of Family Limited
Partnership (3d ed. 2007) ("When the family transfers assets into the limited partnership these
assets become the legal property of the Family Limited Partnership. Once the assets are transferred to the limited partnership, the parents may begin a gifting program to transfer the limited
partnership interests to their children and grandchildren."). Although the discounts accruing
to FLPs are due in large part to the fact that a limited partner cannot compel dissolution of
the partnerships, estate planners typically explain how to get the assets from the FLP after
the decedent's death. Id. at § 2:45 ("An FLP may have a scheduled termination date or event.
Families can cancel an FLP at any time before the scheduled termination. However, all partners
must unanimously consent unless the agreement gives specific partners the right to dissolve the
partnership. Upon dissolution all of the assets in the FLP will be transferred to the partners'
direct ownership in proportion to their interests in the partnership, without penalties.").
20 See Brockman v. Commissioner, 903 F.2d 518, 519 (7th Cir. 1990) ("For the purpose of
determining federal estate tax, Section 2032A of the Internal Revenue Code allows heirs to
family farms to value the assets of the farm in their current use, rather than being required, like
other heirs, to value the assets at their commercially most lucrative use.").
21
839 F.2d 1249, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1988) ("This is not to suggest that a donor can never
gain a tax advantage from acts intended by him to depress the value of the gift. If you own the
Mona Lisa and paint (indelibly) a mustache on it before giving the painting to your child, with
the result that its value is greatly reduced, still your gift tax will be computed at the reduced
value. Maybe that is how Whittemore is to be understood. Or maybe it simply was wrongly
decided, not because the court should have tried to estimate the probability of the heirs' getting
together and reassembling their father's control bloc but because the 600 shares should have
been valued as if sold to a hypothetical buyer, who would pay a premium for control.").
22!d. at 1255.
23!d. ("This would make it a more costly method of reducing the market value of the stock
when and if transferred than would be deferring the restriction until the stock was no longer
theirs. Hence, as we noted earlier in a different context, it would be a self-limiting tactic; and
hence it would have less appeal as a method of avoiding taxes.").
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, NO.3
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By contrast, of course, FLPs have proliferated and are extensively marketed 24
because of the much greater estate tax savings such planning, only modestly
expensive,25 achieves. 26
More importantly, however, a sane seller would not have intentionally
placed a mustache on the Mona Lisa. So, ascribing volitional acts to the owner
of a valuable painting that are contrary to common sense produces the kind
of illogic and distortion that this article is trying to counter. Additionally, if
you could remove that mustache to restore the painting to its unmarred value,
you, as a seller, would do just that. Likewise, a rational seller, or his family,
will ultimately liquidate the partnership to receive its assets at their highest
and best value. The mustached Mona Lisa argument is specious and should
be rejected as such.
Recently, the Tax Court in Estate of Lee v. Commissione,:z7 refused to give
effect to the provisions,in decedent's will that defined his wife as a "surviving
spouse" when she actually died 46 days before him, despite directions in his
will that this definition be applied. 28 The court stated: "[t]he ordinary meaning of the word 'survivor' is one who survives another; ... the term 'surviving spouse' requires that a spouse actually survive his or her spouse; [that is],
the later-dying spouse must actually outlive his or her spouse."29 Likewise, a

24Ronald R. Cresswell, Patrick J. Pacheco, Sarah Patel Pacheco, & Marjorie J. Stephens, 4
TEX. PRAC. GUIDE WILLS, TRUSTS AND EsT. PLAN. § 13:11 ("Although it appears that some
planners believe that everyone needs an FLP (much in the same way these same planners believe
everyone needs an ILIT), not all clients are suitable prospects for an FLP. For example, while
substantial tax savings may in fact be available, the make-up or total value of the client's assets
may make an FLP wholly unsuitable."); Eller, supra note 19, at 192 ("Estates [also] reported
almost $1.7 billion in family limited partnership interests."). In her article, Eller reports,
"[w]hile family-owned businesses are frequently organized as limited partnerships, for several
years now, wealth management and estate planning professionals have advocated use of the
entities as tax shelters for family wealth." Id.
25Cresswell, supra note 24, at § 13:19 ("What is the smallest estate size necessary for a viable
FLP? The opinion[slof practitioners vary widely with many focusing solely on the potential tax
savings versus the relatively de minimis cost of formation and operation in recommending FLP
planning to relatively 'small' net worth clients. Unfortunately, this thinking ignores important
aspects of the FLP decision such as ... the costs of defending the FLP in the face of [Service]
challenge, etc. For example, [Service] audit requests may be highly detailed and very expensive
for the client, not to mention the cost of defending the FLP in Tax Court or Federal District
Court? While there [are] no bright line tests, it appears that a client who is unable to contribute
at least $3,000,000 to $5,000,000 to an FLP ... [should not do] FLP planning.").
261n re the Appeal of Anderson, No. 313978, 2006 WL 3485542, at *2 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov.
20, 2006) ("Here, it is appellants who chose the form of the transactions at issue in order to use
the FLP's as estate planning vehicles. That form allowed them to take advantage of substantial
estate and gift tax savings.").
27No. 14511-06,2007 WL 4463631 (T.e. Dec. 20, 2007).
281d. at *1, *4 ("While decedent may have intended that Ms. Lee, even though dead, be
deemed to have survived him, the operation of a will or wills cannot alter the order of the actual
deaths of decedent and Ms. Lee.").
291d. at *4.
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"seller" is someone seeking the highest price for her product; she would inherently not intentionally destroy that value.
II. A Creature of the Regulations
The definition of fair market value appears in the estate tax Regulations under
section 2031 and courts have been reluctant to stray from this venerable, and
for the most part workable, definition of market value. 30 Likewise, although
legislation has been proposed to thwart valuation discounts,31 there has been
little progress in this quarter. Congress has enacted very little legislation dealing with transfer taxes; its chief concern at this point appears to center around
the exemption amount and rates. 32
The hypothetical standard definition of fair market value is a creature of the
Regulations; however, for valuing different types of property, the regulations
provide special rules. 33 In United States v. Cartwright, the Supreme Court held
that the valuation rules found in the Regulations were inadequate to deal with
the valuation of mutual funds that "once issued are not subject to disposition

3O'fhe government has assened a "substance over form" argument rhat has been consistently
rejected in coun. See, e.g., Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 84 T.e.M. (CCH) 374, 385,
2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ,. 2002-246, at 1522, affd, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Respondent
contends rhat rhe Thompson Pannership and rhe Turner Pannership should be disregarded for
Federal tax purposes because they lack economic substance and business purpose.... [but rhe
coun held rhat] rhe partnerships had sufficient substance to be recognized for Federal estate and
gift tax purposes."); Knight v. Commissioner, I I 5 T.e. 506, 513-15 (2000); Estate of Strangi
v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478, 485 (2000), aff'd on this issue, rev'd and remanded, 293 F.3d
279,282 (5rh Cir. 2002); Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.e. 449, 464-65 (1999).
31See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM
TAX ExPENDITURES, JCS-02-05 at 2, 396-404 (2005) ("Valuation issues, wherher in rhe context
of charitable contributions, transfer taxes, or orher situations presented by rhe tax law, are a
common source of noncompliance. The repon contains several proposals to resolve valuation
controversies in a simpler and more administrable way."), available at www.house.gov/jct/
pubs05.html; STAFF OF THE JOINT CoMM. ON TAX'N, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL, JCS-I-99 at 291
(1999); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL ExPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL
YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS (2000) at 184-85; OMNIBUS BUDGET AND RECONCILIATION
ACT, H. REp. No. 100-391(II) at 1043 (1987).
32'fhe Economic Growrh and Tax Relief ReconcUiation Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
50 I, 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001) [EGTRRA], repealed rhe estate and generation skipping transfer
taxes for rhe year 2010; however, under rhe sunset provision, in 2011, rhese taxes will reappear
as rhey existed before rhe 2001 legislation. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat.
38, 150. There have been numerous anempts to abolish rhese transfer taxes permanently, see,
e.g., H.R. Res. 8, 109rh Congo (2006); H.R. 64, 109rh Cong., 1st Sess. (2005), but rhe more
recent proposals have focused on rhe exemption amount and rates. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 4235,
110rh Cong., 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. Res. 4172, 110rh Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 4242, 110rh
Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 5970, 109rh Cong. (2006). See generally Nonna Noto, CRS Repon
for Congress, Estate Tax Legislation in the J09th Congress (2006), available at hnp:lldigital.
library.unt.edulgovdocslcrs/permalinklmeta-crs-7434:1.
33&e Reg. §§ 20.2031-2 to -9.
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in a market of 'willing buyers' and 'willing sellers."'34 Because of the lack of
potential buyers (as shares must be redeemed by the issuing company), the
court held that mutual funds were most reasonably valued by their redemption price35 and not the price of the government's Regulation,36 the price in
the public offering market, or the "asked" price. 37 Thus, the court held that
the general valuation rule was inapplicable here. "Whatever the situations may
be where it is realistic and appropriate ... to use a standardized retail price to
measure value for estate tax purposes, it is sufficient to note here that for the
reasons given, the valuation of mutual fund shares does not present one of
those situations."38 Treasury revised its Regulations to conform to Cartwright,39
and it is time for Treasury to carve out another exception to its fair market
value definition when its terms have lost their natural meaning.
Treasury could find assistance in the income taX Regulations that specifically
deny deductions for losses where they stem from the taxpayer's intentional
destruction of value. Currently, there are two Regulations under section 165
that deny income tax property loss deductions for the taXpayer's volitional acts
that diminish her property's value. First, there is a Regulation that denies a loss
deduction for taxpayers who acquire real estate with the intent to demolish
existing buildings40 and second, under the casualty loss Regulations, there is a
prohibition against a deduction for the valuation loss in an automobile accident where the taxpayer or his agents were grossly negligent or intentionally
created the casualty.41

34411 U.S. 546, 559 (1973). According to the court, "'[r]he resulr of this pricing sysrem, ir
is apparenr, is rhar rhe entire cosr of selling fund shares is generally borne exclusively by the
purchaser of new shares and nor by the fund itself. In rhis respecr the offering of mutual fund
shares differs from, say, rhe offering of new shares by a closed-end invesrment company or an
addirional offering 'ar the marker' of shares of an exchange-lisred securiry, where ar leasr a portion of rhe selling cosr is borne by the company selling the shares.' Privare rrading in murual
fund shares is vircually nonexisrent. Thus, ar any given time, under the sratutory scheme creared
by rhe Invesrment Company Acr, shares of any open-end mutual fund with a sales load are
being sold ar two distincr prices. Initial purchases by the public are made from the fund, ar the
'asked' price, which includes the load. Bur shareholders 'sell' their shares back ro the fund ar the
srarutorily defined redemption or bid price." !d. ar 548-49 (cirarions omirred).
35Id. ar 560 ("[Tlhe only pracrical means of disposing of mutual fund shares once acquired is
redemption, and redemption cannor be deemed a sale of the sort described in the general rule
(Reg. §20.2031-1(b», since rhe parry purchasing (the issuing company) is under an absolure
obligation to redeem the shares when rendered, and the parry selling has no pracrical a1rernarive, if he wishes to liquidare his holdings, other than ro offer them ro the issuing company
for redemprion.").
36'fhe court therefore affirmed the appellare court and invalidared Regularion § 20.2031-8(b)
as an unreasonable regularion.!d. ar 557.
37Id. ar 551-52.
38Id. ar 553 n.8.
39Reg. §§ 20.2031-8(b), 25.2512-6(b) (shares of open-end invesrment company).
40Reg. § 1.165-3.
4lReg. § 1.165-7.
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A. Purchase with Intent to Demolish a Building
Where business or investment real property is purchased with the intention of destroying the buildings on the land, no deduction is allowed for
the demolition and the entire basis must be allocated to the land. 42 This
Regulation applies regardless of whether that plan is "subsequendy deferred or
abandoned."43 However, a plan formed after purchase to demolish a building
does not fall within the proscription of this regulation. 44 While evidence of
such an objective is determined under a facts and circumstances test,45 factors
indicating intent include variable factors such as timing, cost, prohibitions,
suitability, and lack of income. 46 In Wilson v. Commissioner, the Tax Coun
applied common sense notions about behavior:
It is hard to imagine why a prudent businessman would purchase the Rizzuto property to raise prunes in light of the decline in the prune market and
the insect infestation problem that existed at that time. On the other hand,
it is easily understandable why one would purchase the property for real
estate investment purposesY

Then, the court proceeded to review all of the factors and arrived at the same
conclusion to deny the taxpayer his loss deduction. 48
The cited regulation is the current version of an extremely old one, written
in 1921,49 and reverberates with simplicity and common sense:

42 Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(I}. Basis is adjusted to reflect either the cost of demolition (upward) or
the net proceeds from the demolition (downward). !d. Before demolition, if used for business
or income production, some of the basis may be allocated to the building and appropriate
depreciation allowed. Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(2)(i).
43Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(1).
44Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(1).
45Reg. § 1.165-3(c)(1).
46Reg. § l.165-3(c)(2) ("An intention at the time of acquisition to demolish may be suggested
by: (i) A short delay between the date of acquisition and the date of demolition; (ii) Evidence of
prohibitive remodeling costs determined at the time of acquisition; (iii) Evidence of municipal
regulations at the time of acquisition which would prohibit the continued use of the buildings
for profit purposes; (iv) Unsuitability of the buildings for the taxpayer's trade or business; or (v)
Inability at the time of acquisition to realize a reasonable income from the buildings.").
4741 T.C.M. (CCH) 381, 389, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2196.
48Wilson, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 390, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2197-98. ("Again, it
is impossible to make a determination as to Rietz's intent at the time he acquired the Rizzuto
property based solely on one or two facts. However, when all the facts are viewed together,
we find that Rietz intended to remove the prune trees at the time the Rizzuto property was
purchased.").
49It was in effect in 1918. Meyer v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D. Mass. 1965)
("The foregoing regulation is the lineal descendant of the following Treasury regulation, in
effect in 1918 when it was known as Article 142 (see Treasury Regulations, 1919 edition, page
45).").
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'Art. 142 Voluntary removal of buildings.- * * * 'When a taxpayer buys
real estate upon which is located a building which he proceeds to raze with
a view to erecting thereon another building, it will be considered that the
taxpayer has sustained no deductible loss by reason of the demolition of
the old building, and no deductible expense on account of the cost of such
removal, the value of the real estate, exclusive of old improvements, being
presumably equal to the purchase price of the land and buildings plus the
cost of removing the useless building.'50

As the Bender court found, this Regulation, long in effect, has the presumption of correctness. 51
The reasoning underlying this Regulation is that "if the taxpayer buys the
land intending to demolish the building, the building can have no value to
him, and its demolition occasions no loss."52 Likewise, as the Seventh Circuit
in Landerman v. Commissioner explained, the fundamental theory behind the
regulation is that "the taxpayer has incurred no actual uncompensated loss."53
Analogously, where the taxpayer transfers assets to an FLP, it is her expectation and desire temporarily to discount the value of her assets. Moreover, it is
not significant that the taxpayer's intention to reduce the value of her estate
may be a desired consequence that occurs many years after the formation
of the FLP. With respect to the demolition Regulation, the demolition does
not need to happen immediately after purchase and, indeed, the Regulation
further provides that, if prior to demolition, the building is used for business
or investment purposes, the taxpayer may take deductions pursuant to such
interim use. 54 While the FLP functions as a partnership, and it may be treated
as such for income tax purposes, when the transferor makes gifts or dies owning the partnership interests, since he intentionally created the FLP to lower
the value of his assets, that diminution in value attributable to the assets being
held in partnership form should be ignored.
Like the creator of an FLP who seeks to reduce his transfer taxes, the tax-

50Bender v. United States, 383 F.2d 656, 661 (6th Cir. 1967) (citing Reg. 45, Art. 142
(1921».
51Id. at 661 ("Both the length of time this general administrative interpretation has been in
effect and the fact that in the intervening yeatS Congress has not amended the Internal Revenue
Code to alter this interpretation are due some weight."); Meyers, 247 F. Supp. at 943 ("The
regulations, being based upon a series of prior regulations now almost half a century old, have
in effect been approved by the silence of Congress. Moreover, the overwhelming weight of
judicial authoriry supports the proposition that where a taxpayer purchases properry with the
intention of demolishing either immediately or subsequently the buildings thereon, the cost
basis of the property so purchased shall be allocated to the land only.").
S2Ivey v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 862, 864 (2d Cir. 1970) ("The regulations promulgated
under the 1939 Code, Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(e)-2 declared the policy that when 'a taxpayer
buys ... a building, which he proceeds to raze with a view to erecting thereon another building,
it will be considered that the taxpayer has sustained no deductible loss ... the value of the real
estate ... being presumably equal to the purchase price of the land.").
53454 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1971).
54Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(1), -3(a)(2). Su Rev. Rul. 67-445, 1967-2 C.B. 94.
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payer who destroys a building on his property is not irrational. In the latter
circumstance, the taxpayer is willing to have an interim loss in value because
she usually expects to replace the demolished building with a much more valuable holding. Sometimes, moreover, the land itself is more valuable without
the particular building on it. That was the case in Barry v. United StatesY
The government's expert witness, Mr. Curry, testified that on the date of
inheritance, as well as on the alternate valuation date, the highest and best
use of the property was either as vacant land suitable for parking, or suitable
and available for the construction of a new commercial building. He further
testified and the trial judge accepted his opinion that the old building was
a detriment to the overall value of the property. Contrary to the assertion
of appellants, the other downtown real estate sales investigated and relied
upon by the government expert as com parables, provided convincing support, not only for Mr. Curry's valuation of the property as a whole, but for
his conclusion that the entire value of it lay in the land. 56
With the FLP, the underlying assets are the more valuable holdings and the
reason for the temporary FLP form is the taxpayer's expectation of profit, at a
cost to the federal fisc, through lower transfer taxes.
In Levinson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's arguments that the Regulation disallowing demolition losses "is meant to apply
only in situations where the principal objective of a lease is to obtain the use
of the land and the demolition occurs in order to accomplish that objective"57
and not "where the lease and the circumstances of its negotiation have only the
use of the new building as their principal objective."58 The court underlined
the distinction between the taxpayer's situation where, "by virtue of the lease,
[he] acquired a valuable right and the demolition is an essential precondition
to his realization of the economic benefits therefrom"59 and one in which the
taxpayer "first demolishes the old building, erects a new building on the same
site, and then leases the new building."60 In the latter situation, the court
explained, there was no causal connection between the demolition and the
lease. 61 Likewise, the intentional devaluation of assets occurring by the creation
of an FLP and the transfer of liquid assets to that entity is "the demolition
[that] is an essential precondition to his realization of the economic benefits
therefrom."

55501 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1974).

56Id. at 583.

57 59 T.e. 676, 678 (1973).
58Id. at 679.
59Id. at 680.
(/Jld.
61The COUrt described the distinction: "In the other [situation] such a direct causal relationship between the acquired right and the demolition is lacking, although admirtedly every
taxpayer who constructs a new building with the intention of leasing it necessarily recognizes
that any existing building on the same site must be demolished before his objective can be
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, No.3
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In Wilson v. Commissioner, the rule in the Regulation was extended from
building demolition to the taxpayer's purchase of land with the intent to
destroy the prune trees on it. 62 Thus, the Regulation has not had a restricted
application to buildings; there was the same intention to destroy property at
the time of purchase that merited the disallowance of a loss deduction when
that property was in fact razed. The facts indicated that the prune market was
failing, the trees were infested with insects, and there was a new freeway-highway interchange that made the land itself attractive to an investor. 63 The court
cited a decision from the 1930s in which apple and pear trees were likewise
removed as part of the taxpayer's intention at the time of his land purchase;
in both cases, the taxpayer was denied a loss deduction on the rationale that
there was no basis in the trees due to his intent to remove them. 64 While typically basis would be allocated both to the land and to the trees, the taxpayer's
intention at the time of purchase to ignore the trees by removing them after
purchase provides an exception to the loss rules analogous to the creation of
an FLP with the intention of devaluing the underlying assets for transfer tax
valuation purposes.
Finally, there are some cases where the demolition loss provision applied
where the taxpayer alternatively argued that he was entitled to a casualty loss.
However, where the demolition Regulation applies, the taxpayer's basis is zero,
effectively also denying him a casualty loss deduction that is limited by the
value of the taxpayer's basis. 65
The Regulation redefines market value based on the purchaser's intention
to devalue his property. Without knowing the purchaser's intention, there is
no reason not to apportion the total cost objectively both to the land and to
the building. Indeed, two purchasers with different objectives would have
different tax consequences under that loss Regulation. The voluntary removal
of a building that the purchaser of the property intended from the outset to

realized. In essence the respondent has simply adapted an old saying by incorporating into his
regulations a recognition of the fact that a taxpayer with 'a bird in the hand' is in a different
position than a taxpayer with 'two in the bush.'" Id.
62
41 T.C.M. (CCH) 381, 386, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2194 ("As is evident from
the above discussion, the regulations under section 165 deal with a situation involving the question of whether the taxpayer acquired real property with the intent, at the time of purchase, to
demolish buildings situated thereon. By analogy, we find these regulations equally applicable to
this case involving the removal of prune trees from real property acquired by purchase.").
63Wilson, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 382-83, 1980T.C.M. (RIA)! 80,514, at 2189-90.
6Ii&( Wilson, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 386, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2194 (citing Eaton
v. Commissioner, 1936-239 P-H B.T.A. Memorandum Decisions, aff'd, 95 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.
1938».
65S((, (.g., Wilson, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 390, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 80,514, at 2198 ("We
do not find it necessary to respond to petitioners' arguments that they should be allowed a
deductible loss for the removal of the prune trees under a casualty loss theory. Since we have
determined that the prune trees have a zero cost basis, petitioners cannot be said to have
sustained a deductible loss, under any theory, for the removal of the prune trees."); Reg. §
1.l65-7(b)(l)(ii).
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destroy does not result in a loss to him. Likewise, the voluntary devaluation
caused by the owner of liquid assets by intentionally subjecting them to the
restrictions of an FLP should not be a diminution recognized by the fair market value definition Regulations because, in that instance, he is not acting like
a seller, who by nature is profit-seeking.

B. Automobile Damage Due to Taxpayer's Gross Negligence or Intentional Acts
Where a taxpayer acts willfully such that a probable consequence of his actions
is damage or destruction of his automobile, he is not entitled to a casualty
loss deduction for that loss in value. According to the Regulation, automobile
damage "due to the willful act or willful negligence of the taxpayer or of one
acting in his behalf" is not deductible. 66 While the taxpayer may have legal
"fault" or liability and may still qualify for a deduction, where she is liable for
willful or gross negligence, she will be denied a casualty loss deduction. 67
This Regulation68 was promulgated in response to a very early case, Shearer
v. Anderson, in which the plaintiff was denied a deduction with respect to the
property damage due to a collision caused by icy road conditions during his
chauffeur's larcenous use of his automobile. 69 The court had to determine
whether term "other casualty" as used in the stature covered damage from that
accident. The court allowed the deduction because
[w]hether the complaint be interpreted as charging the loss to be due
proximately to the overturning caused by the faulty driving of the chauffeur
over any icy road, or to subsequent freezing of the motor, in any event, it is
alleged to be due to a casualty, analogous to a shipwreck, not caused by the
willful act or neglect of the owner, or of one acting in his behalf.70

66Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3) provides: "An auromobile owned by the taxpayer, whether used for
business purposes or maintained for recreation or pleasure, may be the subject of a casualty loss,
including those losses specifically referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. In addition,
a casualty loss occurs when an automobile owned by the taxpayer is damaged and when: (i) The
damage results from the faulty driving of the taxpayer or other person operating the automobile
but is not due to the Willful act or willful negligence ofthe taxpayer or ofone acting in his behalfor
(ii) The damage results from the faulty driving of the operator of the vehicle with which the
automobile of the taxpayer collides." (emphasis added).
67Parber v. Commissioner, 57 T.e. 714, 718 (1972); White v. Commissioner, 48 T.e. 430
(1967) (deduction for diamond popping from the taxpayer's ring when she closed the car door
on her hand was allowed as a casualty loss).
68Reg. § 214, art. 141, 1928-VII-l e.B. 85. This regulation, excluding the taxpayer's "willful act or negligence" was declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-43, 1969-1 e.B. 310. However,
"willful act or willful negligence" is used currently in Reg. §1.l65-7(a)(3).
69'fhe court in Shearer was interpreting section 214a(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, but
that provision remains unchanged with respect to the use of the term "other casualty." 6 F.2d
995 (2d Cir. 1927).
7°Id. at 996-97 (emphasis added). It also might be deductible as a theft loss.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, No.3
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Inherently, casualty losses must be unexpected; thus, the destruction of
property by an arsonist or even an angry person who lawfully destroys an
expensive lamp (or mars the recipient wall of his home) would not so qualify.
That was the result in Blackman v. Commissioner where the taxpayer intentionally ignited his wife's clothes and, consequently, burned his house to the
ground. 71 According to the court, his gross negligence barred the deduction.72
Admittedly, there is an element of public policy in expanding the Regulation
to cover these facts: "[i]n addition, allowing the petitioner a deduction would
severely and immediately frustrate the articulated public policy of Maryland
against arson and burning."73 One might likewise argue that there is a public
policy argument against allowing a discount for the taxpayer's transfer of liquid
assets to an FLP because the taxpayer is intentionally devaluing her property
for transfer tax purposes, distorting what she rightfully owes to the public.
Thus, courts have held that "[n]eedless to say, the taxpayer may not knowingly or willfully sit back and allow himself to be damaged in his property or
willfully damage· the property himself"74 and still qualify for a casualty loss
deduction. That is, they have expanded on the duty of the taxpayer to prevent
a casualty loss as a prerequisite for qualification for the deduction. While the
Regulation concerns automobile damage as a casualty loss deduction, the
courts have also looked at the taxpayer's actions in other types of casualties.
Its application has been consistently broadened so that wherever unexpected,
accidental force is exerted on property and the taxpayer is powerless to prevent
application ofthe force because ofthe suddenness thereofor some disability, the
resulting direct or proximate damage causes a loss which is like or similar
to losses arising from the causes specifically enumerated in section 165(c)
(3).75

For example, in Axelrod v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was denied a deduction
for the sailboat that he raced because he had not proved that it was damaged
by a casualty,76 He had failed to prove he "did not 'knowingly or willfully sit
back and allow' his property to be damaged or through his persistent hard

71 88 T.e.

677 (1987).

72Id. at 682 ("In our judgment, the petitioner's conduct was grossly negligent, or worse. He
admitted that he started the flre. He claims that he attempted to extinguish it by putting water
on it. Yet, the flremen found clothing still on the stove, and there is no evidence to corroborate
the petitioner's claim that he attempted to dowse the flame. The fact is that the flre spread to
the entire house, and we have only vague and not very persuasive evidence concerning the
petitioner's attempt to extinguish the flre. Once a person starts a flre, he has an obligation to
make extraordinary efforts to be sure that the flre is safely extinguished, and this petitioner has
failed to demonstrate that he made such extraordinary efforts. The house flre was a foreseeable
consequence of the setting of the clothes [onl flre, and a consequence made more likely if the
petitioner failed to take adequate precautions to prevent it.").

73Id.
74White v. Commissioner, 48 T.e. 430, 435 (1967).

75Id. (emphasis added).
76 56 T.e.

248 (1972).
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sailing and not turning in as did 38 other boats in fact 'willfully damage the
property himself.'''77
With respect to casualty losses, a taxpayer may not deduct a compensated
loss because to do so would be to give "an unwarranted tax benefit to taxpayers who sustain essentially ephemeral losses .... The allowance of a loss under
such circumstances would clearly provide a windfall to taxpayers who have
not sustained an economic loss in any realistic sense."78 With respect to FLPs,
the discounted value of a taxpayer's assets in limited partnership form should
be an exception to the general fair market value definition because the only
economic loss he has sustained is the one he has intentionally desired.

III. FLPs: Assets, Intent, and Business
Typically, the creator of an FLP has liquid assets that are converted to illiquid
ones through the transfer of those assets to the limited partnership form,
in which there are limitations on marketability. Moreover, gift-giving often
includes the transfer of minority interests and, after inter vivos gifts, a decedent often holds a minority share in the FLP. Applying the figures from the
estates of decedents who died in 2001, we can see that FLP assets consist
primarily of stock (mostly publicly traded securities) and real property, as
well as bonds, cash assets, and the like. 79 The discounted value of using the
partnership form varies, but ranges 30% to 60%.80
Case law conforms to this description: an FLP is formed primarily with
liquid assets and, by using the FLP form and by being assessed as a limited
partnership interest, the assets become illiquid and devalued. In Estate ofKorby
v. Commissioner, the decedents transferred cash, stocks and bonds to their
n ld. at 258. At the same time, if the taxpayer takes measures to prevent a casualty, those
costs are not in themselves casualty losses for which she may take a deduction. Austin v. Commissioner, 74 T.e. 1334, 1338 (1980) (the removal oftrees to prevent power line problems or
house damage did not constitute a casualty loss). The court held they were analogous to other
section 262 nondeductible personal and living expenses. ld.
78Axe/rod, 56 T.e. at 2590 (Fay, J., concurring).
79Eller, supra note 19 at 192 ("By far, the two most prevalent FLP assets were stock and real
estate. Total stock holdings, including closely held and common stock, or publicly traded stock,
represented almost a third, 32.9%, of all FLP assets, although publicly traded stock made up the
largest share, 85.6% ($468.5 million), of stock holdings. Total real estate represented 30.9% of
FLP assets and included personal residences, improved and unimproved real estate, real estate
partnerships, and teal estate mutual funds, such as teal estate investment trusts (REIT's). Estates
reported bonds as the third largest asset category in FLP's. Included in this category, which
represented 10.9% of all FLP holdings, are bonds of many types, including Federal savings and
other Federal bonds, corporate, foreign, State, and local bonds, as well as bond funds. While
10.8% of all FLP assets were either limited partnerships interests or FLP's with undeterminable
content, the remaining 14.5% of FLP assets were distributed across a handful of asset categories:
cash assets, such as money market accounts and certificates of deposit; noncorporate business
assets; mortgages and notes; other assets, including life insurance and retirement assets; and
mixed mutual funds, which contain a variety of investment instruments.").
BOld. at 197 ("According to [Service) estate and gift tax attorneys, who review and audit
Federal estate tax returns, and various private-sector studies of valuation discounting, recent
discounts ofFLP interests fall between 30% and 60%.").
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, NO.3
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partnerships.81 In Estate ofRosen v. Commissioner, the decedent transferred cash
and marketable securities to her FLp' 82 In Estate ofHarper v. Commissioner, the
decedent transferred marketable securities and a note receivable;83 in Estate of
Thompson v. Commissioner, the decedent did the same. 84 In Kimbell v. United
States, the principal assets transferred to FLP were liquid ones like cash, securities, and notes although, to a much smaller degree, they included oil and
gas working and royalty interests. 85 In Estate ofHarrison v. Commissioner, FLP
assets consisted "primarily of real estate, oil and gas interests, and marketable
securities."86 In Church v. United States, the majority of assets contributed to
the FLP were liquid ones: the date of death valuation of the underlying assets
"was $1,467,748 ... the value of the Ranch accounted for $380,038 [or
25.89%], and the value of the cash and securities contributed by Mrs. Church
was $1,087,710 [or 74.11%]."87 In Estate of Hi/lgren v. Commissioner, the
decedent transferred real estate; 88 in Estate ofAbraham v. CommissionerB 9 and
81471 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Korbys transferred to KPLP stocks valued
at $1,330,442, state and municipal bonds valued at $449,378, and savings bonds valued at
$71,043, for a total transfer of $1,850,863. In return, the Korbys obtained a 98% limited
partnership interest from KPLP. In addition, the Korbys' living trust transferred to KPLP a
savings account worth $37,841, to bring the full funding ofKPLP to $1,888,704. In return,
the living trust obtained a 2% general partnership interest from KPLP.").
82 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, at 1225,2006 T.e.M. (RIA) , 2006-115, at 848 ("On October
11, 1996, decedent's daughter, acting as attorney-in-fact for decedent and as co-trustee of the
Lillie Investment Trust, caused $2,404,781 in cash and marketable securities to be transferred
from the Lillie Investment Trust to the LRFLP as consideration for the Lillie Investment Trust's
99% limited partnership interest.").
8383 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, at 1643,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) , 2002-121, at 710 ("(1) Securities held in a brokerage account at M. L. Stern & Co., Inc., (2) securities held in a Putnam
Investments account, (3) securities held in two Franklin Fund accounts, (4) 2,500 shares of
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc., and (5) a $450,000 note receivable from Jack P. Marsh.").
84382 F.3d 367,370 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Decedent contributed $1,286,000 in securities, along
with notes receivable from Betsy Turner's children totaling $125,000, in exchange for a 95.4%
limited partnership interest in the Turner Partnership" and there was "minimal post-transfer
trading." However, after the partnership was formed, the partners contributed additional assets
including real estate and interests in a real estate partnership.).
85 371 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 2004).
8652 T.e.M. (CCH) 1306, 1308, 1987 T.e.M. (RIA) ,87,008, at 41. Respondent claims
these assets were valued at approximately $60 million on contribution and at decedent's death;
petitioner claims they should be discounted because the decedent's liquidation rights disappeared at his death. Thus, the court adopted the petitioner's argument and valued the assets at
a discounted $33 million .. 52 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1308, 1987 T.e.M. (RIA) , 87,008, adl.
872000-1 U.S.T.e. ,60,369,85 AF.T.R.2d (RIA) 804, 808 (WD. Tex. 2000), aJfd. without
published opinion, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001).
8887 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008, 1011, 2004 T.e.M. (RIA) , 2004-046, at 316 ("The seven
LKHP properties that were contributed to the partnership at its formation included the three
Orange County properties and the University property that were already the subject of the BLA
and that were used to fund the amended trust. In addition, the other three properties that were
contributed were the Crescent Bay, Railroad, and Manzanita properties in California that also
previously were used to fund the amended trust.").
89408 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2005), aff'g 87 T.e.M (CCH) 975, 2004 T.e.M. (RIA) , 2004039.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, No. 3

VALUATION DISCOUNTING TECHNIQUES: TERMS GONE AWRY

791

in Bigelow v. United States,90 the decedents did likewise. 91 In Estate o/Schutt
v. Commissioner, the FLP held Alabama timberlands, marketable securities,
and cash.92 In Estate 0/ Erickson v. Commissioner, the decedent contributed
securities and real estate to her FLP'93 In Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner,
the decedent transferred securities, real estate, an annuity, two life insurance
policies, and $400,000 of limited partnership interests for a total partnership
contribution of approximately $10 million. 94 Finally, in Estate ofStone v. Commissioner, the FLPs consisted mostly of real property, closely held (the family
apparel business) preferred stock, and other securities. 95
From case law, stated rationales for forming an FLP include gift giving,
estate planning, income tax savings, protection of assets from creditors or in
case of a divorce, increased investment management, and asset protection.
An FLP achieves the first three objectives by intentionally undervaluing the
transferor's property. The latter three reasons are often unsupported or belied
by the facts. Yet, even where there is some basis for those purposes, those goals

9°503 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).

91Estate ofAbraham, 49 F.3d at 30 ("[C]ommercial real estate p~operties were placed in the
FLPs.") and Bigelow. 503 F.3d at 960 ("On December 22, 1994, the trust transferred the Padaro
Lane property, then worth $1,450,000, to the partnership in exchange for 14,500 B units.").
92 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1356,2005 T.C.M. (RIA) ,2005-126, at 994.
93 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1177, 2007 T.C.M. (RIA) , 2007-107, at 759 ("The limited
partnership agreement provided that Mrs. Erickson would contribute securities plus a Florida
condominium she owned in exchange for an 86.25% interest in the Partnership. The parties
stipulated that the fair market value of these assets Mrs. Erickson contributed was approximately $2.1 million.").
94417 F.3d 468,473 n.l (5th Cir. 2005), aff'g 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331,2003 T.C.M. (RIA)
, 2003-145 ("The assets that Strangi transferred to SFLP included, inter alia, (1) brokerage
accounts at Smith Barney and Merrill-Lynch valued at $7.4 million; (2) an annuity valued at
$276,000; (3) two life insurance policies valued at a total of $70,000; (4) two houses in Waco;
(5) a condominium in Dallas; (6) a commercial warehouse in Dallas; and (7) several limited
partnership interests, valued at approximately $400,000.").
9586T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 560-61, 2003T.C.M. (RIA), 2003-309. Id. at 1748-49 ("Eugene
Earle Stone, N, had a particular interest in managing, and maintaining the value of, the preferred stock of Stones, Inc., and it was decided that approximately $1 million of such stock, as
well as certain other property, was to be transferred to ES4LP. C. Rivers Stone had a particular
interest in managing Mr. Stone's Piney Mountain property, and it was decided that various
parcels of that property totaling 366.097 acres, as well as certain other property, were to be
transferred to CRSLP. Ms. Morris had a particular interest in managing certain of her parents'
stock and securities, including at least some of Mr. Stone's preferred stock in Stones, Inc., and
it was decided that various stock and securities, including approximately $642,000 of such
preferred stock, as well as certain other property, was to be transferred to RSMLP. Ms. Fraser
had a particular interest in managing her parents' Cedar Mountain property, and it was decided
that the 1054.415-acre parcel of that property, as well as certain other property, was to be
transferred to MSFLP. All of the children had a particular interest in the Cherrydale residence,
and it was decided that that property, as well as certain other property, was to be transferred to
ES3LP.") (citations omitted).
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are insufficient to produce a counterweight for the discounts that ultimately
are not profit-driven. A hypothetical seller whose goal is to maximize her
profit would not create an FLP and transfer mostly liquid assets to that entity
because the primary consequence of creating an FLP is to devalue liquid assets.
In Citizens Bank 6- Trust, the Seventh Circuit stated that "restrictions imposed
before transfer are taken into account, provided they are not motivated by a
desire to avoid gift or estate tax. "96 Since that principal intention is sometimes
obfuscated by other purported purposes for the creation of an FLP, the focus
needs to be on the creator's intention to devalue his liquid property, something
a seller would not do and something Treasury should remedy in its definition
of fair market value.
Occasionally, the FLPs state that they were formed to serve the creator's
donative or estate planning intentions; additionally, the creator often makes
gifts of FLP interests to her family after she has established her FLP. Facilitating the transferor's gift giving was named as a primary purpose of the FLPs
in Thompson,97 Estate ofStrangi,98 Estate ofAbraham,99 and, after the formation of the FLP, the decedent in those cases indeed made family gifts in these
and other cases.100 In Kimbell, one of the stated purposes was to "establish a

96
839 F.2d at 1252 (emphasis added).
97Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367, 369 (3d Cir. 2004) ("A financial advisor to
decedent's family stated the primary advantages of the Fonress Plan included: '(I) lowering the
taxable value of the estate, (2) maximizing the preservation of assets, (3) reducing income taxes
by having the corporate general partner provide medical, retirement, and 'income splitting'
benefits for family members, and (4) facilitating family and charitable giving.'").
8
9 Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468,473 (5th Cir. 2005) (Like Thompson,
Estate ofStrang; also used the Fonress Plan. "The Fonress Plan was billed as a means of using
limited partnerships as a tool for (I) asset preservation, (2) estate planning, (3) income tax
planning, and (4) charitable giving. Fortress marketed the plan as a means of, among other
things, 'lowering the taxable value of your estate' by means of 'well established court doctrines
which recognize that the value of a limited partnership interest is worth less than the value of
the assets owned by the limited partnership'").
99Estate of Abraham v. Commissioner, 408 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The decree provided
that annual gifts consisting of limited partnership interests in the three FLPs would be made 'in
amounts not to exceed the then available annual gift tax exclusion for federal gift tax purposes'
to the three children and their families.").
100 Thompson, 362 F.3d at 371-72 ("In 1993, the Turner and Thompson Partnerships
made cash distributions of $40,000 each to decedent which he used to provide holiday
gifts to family members. Again in 1995, the Thompson and Turner Partnerships made
cash distributions to decedent of $45,500 and $45,220 respectively. During the same
time period, decedent made gifts of interests in both partnerships to individual family
members."); Estate of Abraham, 408 F.3d at 28 ("Between 1995, when the FLPs were set
up, and 1997, when Mrs. Abraham died, she, through her guardian ad litem, transferred
percentage interests of her share in the partnerships to her children and their families.");
Estate of Korby v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2006) (In the year after
the FLP formation, "the Korbys gifted their 98% limited partnership interest in KPLP
to four irrevocable trusts created for their sons, with each son's trust receiving a 24.5%
KPLP limited partnership interest. The Korbys Hied gift tax returns in 1995 claiming a
discount of 43.61% on the book value of each gift because the limited partnership interests
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method by which annual gifts can be made without fractionalizing Family
Assets."101 The goals of reducing the decedent's estate and minimizing income
taxes were stated purposes of all of the Fortress Plan FLPs;lo2 the FLP in Estate
ofAbraham likewise was created to save estate taxes.103 It was also the factual
purpose in Rosen lO4 although the stated purpose was stock trading, financing,
and "any other purpose allowed by applicable law."105 Similarly, in Erickson,
the decedent's daughters were clearly motivated to create the FLP for decedent
for estate planning purposes. I06 In Estate ofSchutt, the decedent made yearly
family gifts of limited partnership interests in amounts qualifying for the

were minority interests, their transfer was restricted, and they lacked management control.
Thus, while each gift had a book value of $462,732.48, the gift tax returns reported each gift
as being wonh $260,935." Id. Moreover, "[b]etween 1995 and 1998-the year both Korbys
died-KPLP made several distributions to the living trust as general panner, as well as a limited
number of distributions to the four sons' trUSts as limited partners."); Estate of Bigelow v. Commissioner, 503 F.3d 955, 961-62 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Bigelow reported that decedent had given
limited partnership interests in Spindrift to her children and grandchildren valued at $61.85
per unit in 1994 and 1995, $67.79 per unit in 1996, and $61.90 per unit in 1997, applying a
31 % discount for lack of marketability.").
IOIKimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2004).
102SU supra notes 98-99.
103 Estate ofAbraham, 408 F.3d at 29 ("The decree provided for the placing of the three pieces
of income-producing commercial real estate in FLPs and then apportioning out percentage
interests in the FLPs to the children in order to reduce the Estate's tax liability upon Mrs.
Abraham's death.").
I04Estate of Rosen v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1223,2006 T.C.M. (RIA)
, 2006-115, at 846 {"In 1994, decedent's son-in-law attended a seminar on family limited
partnerships and concluded from this seminar that decedent's assets should be transferred to
a family limited partnership in order to reduce the value of her estate for Federal estate tax
purposes .... Feldman [an estate planning anorney] informed decedent's son-in-law (and later
decedent's daughter) that simply changing the form in which decedent's assets were held from
a trust to a limited partnership would generate significant tax savings. Feldman believed that
such tax savings were a major and significant reason to form a limited pannership into which
decedent's assets would be transferred.").
I05Estate ofRasm, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1224, 2006T.C.M. (RIA), 2007-107, at 847.
I06Erickson v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1177, 20007T.C.M. (RIA) ,2007107 at 758-59 ("Sigrid admined that she did not understand the paniculars of the rransaction.
She was aware, however, that a family limited pannership would have estate tax advantages due
to valuation discounts that apply to the partnership interests .... The credit trUSt did not contribute any of the $1 million in marketable securities it owned to the Partnership. Both Karen
and Sigrid were aware that there were no estate tax concerns regarding the assets in the credit
trust unlike the estate tax concerns they had regarding Mrs. Erickson's personal assets. Instead,
Karen and Sigrid would receive the credit trust assets free of estate tax after Mrs. Erickson's
death. They thus opted to leave the credit trust securities outside the Pannership.").
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annual exclusion for gift tax purposes. 107
Often FLPs are created near the end of an individual's life or at a time of
illness or incapacity or both, implicitly suggesting an estate planning motive.
"Estates of decedents 90 and older reported the largest average FLP holdings,
about $1.4 million per estate ...."108 In Estate ofAbraham, the decedent's
FLP was created when she had Alzheimer's disease.109 Likewise, in Erickson, the
decedent was 88 years old and had Alzheimer's. I 10 In Korby, Mrs. Korby was
similarly affiicted l11 and Mr. Korby was 79 years old with heart problems. 112
In Rosen, the "decedent was 88 years old and in failing health."113 In Harrison,
the decedent's sons, under his powers of attorney, created an FLP about 6
months before decedent's death when his health was precarious. 114 In Bigelow,
the decedent was in her mid-80s, had suffered a debilitating stroke, and had
moved to an assisted living accommodation when the FLP agreement was
executed. ll5 In Harper, the decedent was 85 116 and had cancer.ll7 In Hillgren,
when the FLP was formed, the decedent had been diagnosed with mental

107Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1356,2005 T.C.M. (RIA) !
2005-126, at 1007 (This fact undermines the Tax Court's finding that the decedent's refusal
to make certain gifts of FLP interests in one year to certain family members was an indication
of a non-tax motive (emphasis added»; Estate ofSchutt, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1365,2005
T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2005-126, at 1007 ("In 1994, decedent declined to make annual exclusion
gifts of limited partnership interests in the Schutt Family Limited Partnership to his daughter
Sarah S. Harrison and her children.").
J08Eller, supra note 19, at 197 ("Estates of decedents 90 and older reported the largest average FLP holdings, about $1.4 million per estate, while estates of decedents under 50 reported
the smallest average FLP holdings, $630,700 per estate. These youngest decedents were still
accumulating wealth at the time of their deaths and certainly had not begun to consider asset
divestiture plans, such as the formation ofFLP's and the 'gifting' ofFLP interests.").
I09Abraham v. Commissioner, 408 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2005).
II°Erickson, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175,1177, 2007T.C.M. (RIA)! 2007-107, at 758 ("Mrs.
Erickson's doctor confirmed a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease on March 5, 1999, when Mrs.
Erickson was 86 years old. Mrs. Erickson's Alzheimer's disease continued to progress. By May
2000, Mrs. Erickson no longer drove or cooked."). The FLP agreement was signed in 2001.

Id.
II IKorby v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 848,850 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Edna Korby began living
in a nursing home in Pelican Lake, Minnesota, in February 1993 when she was diagnosed with
severe Alzheimer's dementia. She lived there until she died on July 3, 1998.").
I12Korby, 89T.C.M. (CCH) 1142,2005 T.C.M. (RIA)! 2005-102.
I13Rosen v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220,2006 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2006-115.
114Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1307, T.C.M. (P-H)
! 87,008, at 41 (1987).
I15Bigelow v. United States, 503 F.3d 955, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2007).
116Harper v. Commissioner, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121.
117Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1641,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 708. ("Decedent was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1983 and with cancer of the rectum in 1989.").
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illness and had tried to commit suicide. I IS In Thompson, the decedent was
93 when the FLP was formed. 1I9 In Kimbell the decedent was 96 when, two
months before her death, she created her FLP with a term of forty years. 120 In

Strangi, " [a]s foiling health began to telegraph that the inevitable would occur,
Albert Strangi transferred approximately ten million dollars worth of personal
assets into a family limited partnership."121 Finally, in Church, two days before
she died, the decedent created an FLP'122
In Harper, the primary purpose of forming the FLP, as stated in the agreement, was investment management l23 although according to the estate, the
FLP was mainly organized for "the business purpose of protecting from Lynn's
creditors the assets that Lynn would receive or inherit from decedent. "124 While
it was true that decedent's daughter Lynn had creditors in connection with
litigation over her condominium,125 decedent was 85 with metastatic cancers
and hospitalized at the time he transferred 60% of his FLP to his two children
and funded his FLP with trust assets. 126 The court emphasized the testamentary nature of the transactions and the decedent's desire to use the partnership for estate planning purposes.1 27 Underlining those intentions, the court
concluded that the decedent "wanted to protect what Lynn would receive
from him, not what she currently possessed."12S In Hillgren, the principal stated
purpose was asset protection although the management of the assets remained
J18HiIlgren v. Commissioner, 87 T.e.M. (CCH) 1008, 1009,2004 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2004046, at 313. Within a year, the decedent had a second, this time successful, suicide attempt.

Id.
J19'fhompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367, 370-72 (3d Cir. 2004).
12°Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-02 (N.D. Tex. 2003), vacated
and remanded by 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The Partnership is for a term of 40 years (i.e.,
until Decedent would have been 136 years old).").
'2lStrangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
I22Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. ! 60,369, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 804 (WD. Tex.
2000).
123Harper v. Commissioner, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) 1641,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-12l.
124Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1646,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 714 (emphasis
added).
125Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1642,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 708.
126Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1644,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 711-12.
I27Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1650-52,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 719-21
("While we acknowledge that HFLP did come into existence prior to decedent's death and that
some change ensued in the formal relationship of those involved to the assets, we are satisfied
that any practical effect during decedent's life was minimal. Rather, the partnership served primarily as an alternate vehicle through which decedent would provide for his children at his death
.... Hence, not only the objective evidence concerning HFLP's history but also the subjective motivation underlying the entity's creation suppon an inference that the arrangement was
primarily testamentary in nature .... The fact that the contributed propeny constituted the
majority of decedent's assets, including nearly all of his investments, is also not at odds with
what one would expect to be the prime concern of an estate plan. We additionally take note of
decedent's advanced age, serious health conditions, and experience as an anorney.").
128Harper, 83 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1652,2002 T.e.M. (RIA) ! 2002-121, at 722 (emphasis
added).
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the same 129 and decedent and Hillgren conducted partnership business without even revealing the FLP's existence. 130 Likewise, in Estate ofRosen, Strangi,
and Estate ofBigelow, there was little change in the relationship between each
decedent and his or her assets. 131 Additionally, in Bigelow, while the stated
purpose of the FLP was to own and operate residential real estate, decedent's
only residence, not only did nobody respect the entity's formalities, but also
the only actual purpose for the transfer was to reduce the value of decedent's
gifts, which the children, under a power of attorney, made to themselves on
decedent's behalf 132
In Kimbell, protection from potential creditors of their oil and gas
interests 133 or property division in the instance of a divorce,l34 and asset

129Hillgren v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008, 1013,2004 T.C.M. (RIA) , 2004046, at 319-20 ("In response to questions that were posed by Goldenberg regarding LKHP,
Hillgren explained the purpose of forming the partnership as 'Lea suffered from depression.
She did not have a husband. She was dating a young guy. He was worried about his motives
and she was worried too. The Partnership served as an asset protection.' Hillgren gave the
same answer in response to questions as to why they formed the partnership when Hillgren
was already managing decedent's properties under the BLA. Hillgren also stated that his rights
under the BLA were senior to the partnership agreement and that he gave his consent for the
transfer of the properties to LKHP'").
13Wilgren, 87T.C.M. (CCH) at 1012, 2004 T.C.M. (RIA), 2004-046, at 317 ("The partnership was designed generally to be invisible to the public and to persons with whom decedent
and Hillgren did business.").
131Estate of Rosen v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1225, 2006 T.C.M. (RIA)
,2006-115, at 848 ("After the transfer, there was no material change in the manner in which
the transferred assets were managed."); Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468, 481-82 (5th
Cir. 1005) ("In short, although Strangi may have transferred a substantial percentage of assets
that might have been actively managed under SFLp, the Tax Court concluded, based on substantial evidence, that no such management ever took place. From this, the Tax Court fairly
inferred that active management was objectively unlikely as of the date of SFLP's creation. As
such, we cannot say that the Tax Court clearly erred in rejecting the Estate's 'active management' rationale." (emphasis in original text»; Estate of Bigelow v. Commissioner, 503 F.3d 955,
972 (9th Cir. 2007) (,,[Tlhe Padaro Lane property was Spindrift's sole asset, required no active
management, and was the partnership's only business.").
132Estate o/Bigelow, 504 F.3d at 961-62 ("Bigelow reported that decedent had given limited
partnership interests in Spindrift to her children and grandchildren valued at $61.85 per unit
in 1994 and 1995, $67.79 per unit in 1996, and $61.90 per unit in 1997, applying a 31%
discount for lack of marketability."). In addition, the estate argued that her FLP "enhanced the
ease of gifting interests to decedent's children and grandchildren." to which the court explained,
"[f]irst, gift giving is considered a testamentary purpose and cannot be justified as a legitimate,
non-tax business justification." !d. at 972.
133Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257,268 ("Specifically, a living trust did not provide
legal protection from creditors as a limited partnership would. That protection was viewed as
essential by Mr. Elyea and Mrs. Kimbell because she was investing as a working interest owner
in oil and gas properties and could be personally liable for any environmental issues that arose
in the operation of those properties. Mr. Elyea also stated that Mrs. Kimbell wanted the oil
and gas operations to continue beyond her lifetime and they felt that by purring the assets in
a limited partnership, they could keep the pool of capital together in one entity that would be
enhanced over time").
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management 135 were the stated and, according to the circuit court, the
documented rationales for the FLp' I 36 Yet, decedent was 96 years old, the
assets transferred to his FLP were mainly liquid ones, and management
remained essentially the same. In Stone, the Tax Court found that the decedents' prime motivations for the FLP's formation were their "investment
and business [management] concerns"137 and their desire "to resolve the
children's concerns [and disputes] regarding Mr. Stone's and Ms. Stone's
assets."138 However, the children mainly argued over their inheritance
of assets from their parents,139 again indicating decedent's testamentary
intent. 140 Likewise, in Estate of Abraham, one reason to create the decedent's FLP was to end litigation among the decedent's children, 141 but the
resolution consisted of court sanctioned gift-giving and estate planning. 142
134Id. ("Mrs. Kimbell wanted to keep the asset in an entity that would preserve the property
as separate property of her descendants. The family had faced that issue during the divorce of
one of Mrs. Kimbell's grandsons.").
135Id. ("Keeping the assets in one pool, under one management would reduce administrative
costs by keeping all accounting functions together. The partnership would also avoid costs
of recording transfers of oil and gas properties as the property was passed from generation to
generation .... The partnership also served the purpose of setting up the management of the
assets if something should happen to her son, which was a concern as he had experienced some
heart problems and had undergone a serious surgery.").
131i/d. at 260. Other stated purposes in Kimbell were to: "facilitate the administration and
reduce the cost associated with the disability or probate of the estate of Family members; promote the Family's knowledge of and communication about Family Assets; provide resolution
of any disputes which may arise among the Family in order to preserve Family harmony and
avoid the expense and problems of litigation; and consolidate fractional interests in Family
Assets." Id.
I37Stone v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 553, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2003-309, at
1737, n.74 ("At least as early as the last six months of 1995, Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone were in
control of their respective assets. However, they no longer were interested or actively involved
in managing those assets and wanted their children to become actively involved in the management of those assets.").
138Stone, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) at 557, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 2003-309, at 1744 ("Another very
imponant reason why the Stone family desired to explore the use of family limited partnerships
was to sertle and bring an end to the litigation among the children. Finally, the Stone family also
wanted to explore the use of family limited partnerships as a way to help avoid disputes among
the children regarding the ultimate division of their parents' respective assets afrer their parents
died, although that was not the primary reason for the Stone family's interest in exploring the
use of such types of pannerships.").
139Stone, 86T.C.M. (CCH) at 557, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA)! 2003-309, at 1743 ("The primary
reason why the Stone family became very interested in exploring the use of family limited partnerships was to resolve the children's concerns regarding Mr. Stone's and Ms. Stone's assets.").
1400f course, a sure-fire way to find solidarity among squabbling relatives is to show them
that they will all fare bener at their parents' deaths and at the government's expense.
141See Estate of Abraham v. Commissioner, 408 F.3d 26, 29 (lst Cir. 2005) ("Litigation and
discord among the children, mainly berween Richard and the rwo sisters, continued. The feud
was apparently over what amount was needed for Mrs. Abraham's protection. The litigation
was also draining Mrs. Abraham's assets.").
142Estate of Abraham v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 975, 976, 2004 T.C.M. (RIA)
! 2004-039, at 264 ("The reason for the gifring powers was, inter alia, that decedent's estate
'is likely to be subject at her death to * * * taXes at the highest marginal tax rates then in
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In Church, the stated purpose of the limited partnership was "to consolidate
their undivided interests in a family ranch ... for centralized management
... and preserve the Ranch as an on-going enterprise for future generations"
as well as to protect her "assets from judgment creditors in the event of a
catastrophic tort claim against her."143 Yet, the ranch was a relatively minor
asset of the partnership in contrast to the overwhelming liquid assets in the
FLP, decedent died two days after her FLP was created, there was no evidence
of any history of tort claims, and it was clear that decedent's family was concerned about estate planning. l44 Finally, in Estate ofKorby, the estate contended
that the FLPs were created for creditor protection for their business and in
the event of a divorce,145 but the court held that the estate had not proved its
claim 146 and had made the transfer for estate planning purposes. 147
Besides adherence to the formalities of an FLP, how much business must
be conducted by the FLP? A review of case law under section 2036 148 shows
that very little, if any, business must be conducted by the FLP to qualify under

effect' .... On June 13, 1994, decedent's children, their respective counsel, as well as decedent's legal guardians and representatives agreed to a stipulation and agreement for entry of
decree to petition to establish an estate plan for decedent (the decree) regarding decedent's
guardianship."}.
143Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. ,60,369,84,776-77,85 A.ET.R.2d 804, 805
(W.D. Tex. 2000).
144Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. , 60,369, at 84,778, 85 A.ET.R.2d at 807 ("I find that the
Primary purpose of the partners in forming the Partnership was a desire to preserve the family
ranching enterprise for themselves and their descendants."). However, the court found that
"the Partnership was not formed solely to reduce estate taxes." Id. 2000-1 U.S.T.e. , 60,369,
at 84,778, 85 A.ET.R.2d at 808.
145Estate ofKorbyv. Commissioner, 89 T.e.M. (CCH) 1142, 1148,2005 T.e.M. (RIA),
2005-102 at 705 ("The estate argues that the creation of KPLP was bona fide because Austin
and Edna created KPLP to protect the family from commercial and personal injury liability
resulting from their bridge-building business, as well as liability arising from divorce.").
146Estate of Korby v. Commissioner, 471 E3d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 2006) ("The tax court also
rejected the Korbys' claim KPLP was created to protect the family from commercial and personal injury liability arising from their bridge-building business, as well as liability from divorce,
stating 'the estate has not shown that the terms of the KPLP agreement would prevent a creditor
of a partner from obtaining that parmer's KPLP interest in an involuntary transfer.").
1471n Estate ofKorby, the circuit court upheld as not erroneous that ''Austin and Edna formed
KPLP in order to make a testamentary transfer of their assets to their sons at a discounted value
while still having access to the income from those assets for their lifetime." Id Moreover, the
court held that the FLPs were created to pay for the Korbys' personal, living expenses. Id. at
850 ("KPLP made payments to the Korbys' living trust totaling $120,795 ($30,387 in 1995,
$19,334 in 1996, $32,324 in 1997, and $38,750 in 1998)}. The Korbys used these payments
to help defray Edna's nursing home costs of over $30,000 per year and pay the couple's taxes,
medical bills, and other expenses." Id (foomote omitted).
148I.Re. § 2036 provides for the inclusion of the value of the transferred property, in this
instance the underlying assets in an FLP, where the transferor retains, for his life, for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death, or for any period that does not end before his
death, present enjoyment of or income from the property where the transfer was not a bona
fide sale for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
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the bona fide sales exception of that statute. In Estate ofHarrison,149 the court
continually emphasized weaknesses in the government's case. 150 The Estate
ofBongard v. Commissioner court commented that in Estate ofHarrison, "[s]
orne of the assets the decedent contributed included oil and gas assets, which
required active management" I 51 and emphasized the family's successfully
operated family business, but the extent of the FLP's active business activities
was not explained by the court; indeed, the court's business requirement had
a very low threshold. 152 In Church, the decedent's children managed the land,
which was leased for grazing and hunting as well as for oil and gas interests.
The court held that the "character" of the majority of ownership interests
"changed dramatically" after the FLP formation. 153 The liquid assets that

149Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.e.M. (CCH) 1306, 1987 T.e.M. (P-H) ,
87,008. With respect to the decedent's moment of death lapsing liquidation right, Estate of
Harrison was criticized and legislatively reversed by the enactment of section 2704. See Joseph
M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior to Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of
the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REv. 421,489, n.315 (2001); Martin D.
Begleiter, Estate Pumning in the Nineties: Friday the Thirteenth, Chapter 14: Jason Goes to Washington -- Part 1,81 Ky. L.J. 535, 545 n.67 (1993); D. John Thornton and Gregory A. Byton,
Valuation ofFamily Limited Partnership Interests, 32 IDAHO L. REv. 345, 374 (1996) ("Section
2704 was enacted to correct certain perceived valuations abuses associated with lapsing rights
as illustrated in Estate ofHarrison v. Commissioner, and artificial liquidations restrictions under
the control of family members."); Travis L. Bowen and Rick D. Bailey, Limited Partnerships: Use
in Tax, Estate and Business Planning, 32 IDAHO L. REv. 305, 336 (1996).
15°Estate of Harrison, 52 T.e.M. (CCH) at 1309, 1987 T.e.M. (P-H) , 87,008 ("With
respect to business purpose, petitioner presented convincing proof that the partnership was
created as a means of providing necessary and proper management of decedent's properties
and that the partnership was advantageous to and in the b"est interests of decedent. Respondent
presented no proofto rebut petitioner's showing." (emphasis added». Further, the court refused to
find that the FLP was created for testamentary purposes because (1) all of the partners' liquidation rights were restricted; (2) decedent was adequately compensated for the transfer of his
assets to the partnership; and (3) "there is no proofin the record that the partnership was created
other than for business purposes." !d. (emphasis added).
15 1Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.e. 95, 114 (2005).
15 2Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.e.M. (CCH) 1306, 1309, T.e.M. (P-H)
,87,008, at 42-3 (1987). ("[The FLP] agreement will be ignored only if there is no business
purpose for the creation of the partnership or if the agreement is merely a substitute for testamentary disposition. With respect to business purpose, petitioner presented convincing ptoof
that the partnership was created as a means of providing necessary and proper management
of decedent's properties and that the partnership was advantageous to and in the best interests
of decedent. Respondent presented no proof to rebut petitioner's showing." (emphasis added)
(citations omined».
153Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. ,60,369, 84,779, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 804, 807
(WD. Tex. 2000). ("The Government contends that while the formation of the Partnership
took the form of a bona fide business transaction, the transaction had no substance and was
entered into for no purpose other than to reduce the taxation of Mrs. Church's estate. I do not
find this to be the case. The character of the interests owning a majority of the Ranch changed
dramatically as a result of the Partnership. Prior to its formation, Plaintiffs and their descendants would have owned undivided interests in the Ranch, with each interest carrying the right
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comprised the vast majority of assets transferred to the FLP were explained,
satisfactorily to the court, as necessary to restore lost income from an expired
grazing lease.J 54 But, the taxpayer created the FLP only two days before her
death and although the court held that her death from cardiopulmonary collapse was unanticipated, she had been suffering from breast cancer. 155 According to the Tax Court in Estate o/Stone, all of the five FLPs functioned "as joint
enterprises for profit" in which the children provided active management, but
most of the family squabbling was over the children's expected inheritance of
their parents' assets. 156 Moreover, in Estate 0/ Schutt, besides gifts and other
estate planning, the Tax Court found as a sufficient non-tax motive that the
decedent wanted to ensure that certain stock would be held and not sold. 157
However, although that may be a non-tax motive, it is not evidence of any
business or even any profit-seeking motive that is integral to being a seller.
Finally, in Kimbell, the FLP's oil and gas interests constituted a mere 11 %
of its assets. 158 ''At formation, $438,000 of approximately $2.5 million in
assets were oil and gas properties."159 On the other hand, in Kimbell the vast

to use and enjoy the property, or force a partition or possible sale. The Partnership eliminated
these individual rights and placed ownership of a majority of the Ranch in a Partnership that
was not controlled by any single person.").
154Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.C ,60,369, at 84,777, 85 A.F.T.R2d at 806 (WD. Tex. 2000)
("The Partnership was also formed with an eye towards the possibility of actively engaging in
raising cattle. The Ranch was in the midst of a prolonged and continuing drought. The grazing
lease expired in 1994, and there was a question whether it would be renewed. The Partnership
was prepared, if necessary, to replace this lost income through active operations. Working capital
over and above income from the Ranch would have been necessary to engage in this activity"
(citations omitted».
155Her breast cancer was in remission for the six months prior to her death and while the
court held that she was not making a testamentaty transfer, her medical history might have
suggested otherwise. !d.
156Estate of Stone v. Commissioner, 86 T.CM. (CCH) 551, 580, 2003 T.CM. (RIA)
, 2003-309, at 1776.
157Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner, 89 T.CM. (CCH) 1353, 1357, 2005 T.CM. (RIA)
, 2005-126, at 989 ("Among the considerations providing an impetus for this potential restructuring of decedent's assets, Mr. Sweeney and/or Mr. Dinneen recall discussing: (1) Decedent's
concerns regarding sales by family members of core stockholdings and his desire to extend and
perpetuate his buy and hold investment philosophy over family assets; (2) the need to develop
another vehicle through which decedent could continue to make annual exclusion gifts due
to exhaustion of available units in the family limited partnership for this purpose; and (3) the
possibility of valuation discounts.").
158Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 2001) ("At inception, approximately 15% of the assets of the Partnership were oil and gas working (11 %) and royalty (4%)
interests."); Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C 95, 119 (2005) (The oil and gas
properties in Kimbell related to a business created by Mr. Kimbell, decedent's late husband, in
the 1920's.).
159Kimbl!ll, 371 F.3d at 267 (Most (71 %) of the oil and gas interests were "working interests"
as opposed to passive royalty interests.).
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majority of interests were liquid: cash, notes, and securities and her son had
performed the same management expertise for the trust assets before their
transfer to her FLp'I60 Certainly, linle change in management pre- and posttransfer of assets to an FLP undermines any real expectation of a huge growth
potential to recoup the large devaluation due to the change to a limited partnership form. The circuit court in Kimbell considered the other assets necessary for maintaining the oil and gas business. 161 Yet, if indeed the relatively
small business activity required so much liquid assets, one must still question
the profit intention of devaluing such a large percentage of liquid assets and
of retaining the same management personnel with the same duties. With so
much marketable securities, notes, and cash and so little business, with FLP
discounts in Kimbell amounting to roughly 50%,162 how can the post-transfer
values increase beyond the discounted value caused by the illiquid FLP form?
Inevitably, one must wonder whether any seller (without depletion motives)163
would create an FLP primarily with liquid assets and question the policy reason for allowing such a large tax benefit for intentionally devaluing property.
How can $2.5 million that is devalued to $1.25 million be doubled by other
FLP considerations so that the decedent's estate is not depleted?
Beginning with definitions from the gift tax Regulations, a transfer for
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth is defined as
including a "transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a
transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative
intent)."I64 Therefore, that definition includes the requirement that there be

I60Id. at 268.
161Id. at 259,267 ("Nonoperating working interest owners are called upon to pay their share
of operating expenses and to make elections whether to participate in drilling operations or
various phases thereoE"). In Kimbel~ the Fifth Circuit concludes:
The business decision to exchange cash or other assets for a transfer-restricted, nonmanagerial interest in a limited partnership involves financial considerations other
than the purchaser's ability to turn right around and sell the newly acquired limited
partnership interest for 100 cents on the dollar. Investors who acquire such interests
do so with the expectation of realizing benefits such as management expertise,
security and preservation of assets, capital appreciation and avoidance of personal
liability. Thus there is nothing inconsistent in acknowledging, on the one hand, that
the investor's dollars have acquired a limited partnership interest at arm's length for
adequate and full consideration and, on the other hand, that the asset thus acquired
has a present fair market value, i.e., immediate sale potential, of substantially less than
the dollars just paid a classic informed trade-off.

Id. at 266.
I62Id. at 265 ("[T]he value of Mrs. Kimbell's interest in the Partnership is worth only 50% of
the assets she transferred (as discounted for lack of control and marketability)").
163Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004). As the Kimbell court also
stated, "[I)n order for the sale to be for adequate and full consideration, the exchange of assets
for partnership interests must be roughly equivalent so the transfer does not deplete the estate."

Id.
I64Reg. § 25.2512-8.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 61, No.3

802

SECTION OF TAXATION

a functioning business (hence, "in the ordinary course of business") and that
the transfer be "bona fide, at arm's length," and lack any gift-giving motive.
The transfer of assets to an FLP for gift or estate purposes is not likely to
satisfy that last criterion since such transfers are precisely made with a donative purpose. 165 What does "in the ordinary course of a business" mean? The
Regulations should require that the primary intention of creating an FLP and
transferring the decedent's assets to the FLP is consistent with a profit-motive.
If the FLP funds are used to pay the transferor's personal and living expenses,
the transferor's intent clearly lacks a profit-motive. If the transferred assets
consist primarily of a combination of cash, cash equivalents, or marketable
securities, the transferor's intent should be presumed to be lacking a profitmotive to FLP formation. Business or investment profit-motive does not
include gift giving, bequests, or estate planning. Rather, intentions of giftgiving and estate valuation reduction in creating an FLP indicate an intention
to devalue the transferor's assets. Protection from creditors as a purpose not
only requires a history of litigation or other substantiated need for such protection but also needs to exist within the context of a profit making activity
and not to protect personal or family assets when the FLP assets are devalued
by discounts. Solidification of management as a motive requires· significant
post-FLP formation changes in investment to show how the business intended
to recover the devaluation of FLP assets.
The Tax Court's current requirement of a non-tax motive is inadequate. 166
Its Bongard test requires "the existence of a legitimate and significant nontax
reason for creating the family limited partnership, and [that] the transferors
received partnership interests proportionate to the value of the property transferred."167 In Estate ofBongard, the court described factors that indicated the

165Reg. § 25.2512-8. The regulation also states that "[aJ consideration not reducible to a value
in money or money's worth, as love and affection, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly
disregarded, and the entire value of the property transferred constitutes the amount of the gifr."
Id. As most gifts and bequests are made because of the transferor's "love and affection," these
are clearly not business reasons for the FLP creation. !d.
I66SU generally Wendy e. Gerzog, Bongard's Nontax Motive Test: Not Open and Schutt, 107
TAX NOTES 1711 (2005). The Bongard test is used to determine whether or not the "bona fide
sale for adequate and full consideration" exception under section 2036 applies. With respect to
the decedent's FLP in Bongard, the coure held there was only a testamentary, and no nontax,
motive for its formation. Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.e. 95, 125-26 (2005)
("At trial, Mr. Fullmer testified that BFLP was established to provide another layer of credit
protection for decedent. Additionally, the estate assertS that BFLP facilitated decedent's and
Cynthia Bongard's postmarital agreement. Messrs. Bernards and Fullmer both also testified that
BFLP was established, in pan, to make gifts. On December 10, 1997, decedent made a gift of
a 7.72% ownership interest in BFLP to Cynthia Bongard. This gift was the sole transfer of a
BFLP pannership interest by decedent during his life. BFLP also never diversified its assets during decedent's life, never had an investment plan, and never functioned as a business enterprise
or otherwise engaged in any meaningful economic activity.").
167Estate ofBongard, 124 T.e. at 118.
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lack of a nontax purpose: (1) the taXpayer stands on both sides of the transaction; (2) the taxpayer needs partnership distributions for his maintenance and
support; (3) the partners commingle partnership assets with their own; and
(4) the taxpayer does not transfer the property to the FLp'168
The non-tax motive test does not require a profit-making intent and its
threshold is too low to identifY the transferor with a hypothetical seller in the
general fair market value definition sense. Indeed, the insufficiency of that
test is readily apparent in the flawed Estate ofSchutt decision, and even more
marked in the recent Mirowski decision. 169 In Estate ofSchutt, the Tax Court
found that the FLPs were established in order to create an entity to buy and
hold DuPont and Exxon stock, consistent with the decedent's investment
philosophy and that the FLPs were intended to provide centralized management and prevent unwise sales of the decedent's family's stock holdings. 17o
Discussing the non-tax motive factors the court listed the following facts:
There was an actual transfer of the property to the FLPs, there was no commingling of assets, the decedent had retained sufficient assets for his support
and the maintenance of his lifestyle, and the decedent was not on both sides
of the transaction. The Estate of Schutt court explained that there was sufficient evidence of "give-and-take" and that the trust's representatives were very
involved in the process. "Such a scenario bears the earmarks of considered
negotiations, not blind accommodation." 171 In Mirowski, decedent controlled
the formation and terms of the family LLC and the LLC paid her gift and
estate tax liabilities. The only nontax motive in that case was decedent's goal
of family cohesiveness, a purpose common to all FLPs and family LLCs. How
are these findings indicative of a profit-motive sufficient to find equivalence in
value between the transferred assets and their discounted value in FLP form?

Iv. A Working Prototype
The proposed Regulation should resemble the demolition loss and automobile casualty loss Regulations. The following is a working prototype of a new
Regulation (section 20.2031-1(c)) to be added as urged in this article:

§ 20.2031-1(c) Definitions in general. (1) The terms "buyer" and "seller"
are to be used in their normal, customary sense. A buyer is one who is seeking
to pay the lowest price for property and a seller is one who is seeking to sell
property at its highest price.

168Id. at 118-19.
169Estate of Murowski v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo 2008-74; see Wendy e. Gerzog, "Tax
Court FLP Confusion: Mirowski," 120 TAX NOTES 263 OuI. 21, 2008).
17°According to the Tax Court, the FLPs in fact served those aims and both the documentary
and testimonial evidence evinced the decedent's concern over investment control. Estate of
Schutt v. Commissioner, 89 T.e.M. 1353, 1367,2005 T.e.M. (RIA) ~ 2005-126, at 1010.
171Estate ofSchutt, 89 T.e.M. at 1367,2005 T.e.M. (RIA) ~ 2005-126, at 1011.
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(2) Except as provided in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph, when a transferor has intentionally devalued his property, he is not entitled to have the
definition of fair market value in § 20.2031-I(b) applied for v;uuation purposes on the devalued asset. Rather, valuation under that section must be
determined without regard to the volitional acts of valuation depression. This
rule does not apply to the transferor's acts of negligence or gross negligence.
(3) If the transferor is engaged in a trade or business, subparagraph (2) shall
not be applied to property used in that trade or business. If devaluation occurs
when trade or business property is transferred, that transfer must be "bona
fide, at arm's length," and lack "any donative intent."

(4) Evidence of intention.
(i) An intention to devalue property is presumed to occur when the transferor
converts liquid assets to illiquid ones.
(ii) An intention to devalue property as well as donative intent may be suggested by: Gift-giving subsequent to the transfer; or the decedent's ill health
or old age at or near the time of the act of devaluation.
(5) The application of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following
examples:

Example (1). A creates an FLp, which does not function as a business, and
transfers cash, certificates of deposit, and marketable securities to it. A is
presumed to have the intention of devaluing his assets by converting liquid
assets into illiquid ones. When he later transfers his partnership interest to his
children, valuation under section 20.2031-I(b) must be determined withour
regard to the volitional acts of valuation depression. Thus, A must value his
cash, certificates of deposit, or marketable securities without regard to his act
of devaluation. Thus, his partnership interest must be valued by the fair market value of the assets he transferred to the FLP without regard to discounts
attaching to the limited partnership form.

Example (2). B transfers marketable securities and oil interests to her FLP.
The working oil interests represent II % of the assets in the FLP. With respect
to the marketable securities, B is presumed to have the intention of devaluing
her assets by converting liquid assets into illiquid ones and must value the
marketable securities without the discounts attaching to the limited partnership form. Because the working oil interests represent assets used in a trade or
business, they can be valued under the general fair market value definition of
section 20.2031-1 (b) as long as transfers are "bona fide, at arm's length," and
lack "any donative intent." If subsequent to the establishment of the FLp, B
makes gifts of FLP interests to her children, or is 85 years old at the time of
those transfers to the FLp, that fact may indicate that B intended to devalue
his assets or may establish donative intent. In either event, that would require
the oil interests to be valued at their underlying value.
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V. Conclusion
Fair market value is defined in the section 2031 Regulations. That definition
of fair market value relies on for its validity the normal definitions of its significant terms: a "seller" is someone who is seeking the highest price for her
product and a "buyer" is someone who wants to obtain the lowest price for
his purchase. It is only that tension that creates the realistic, and fair, market
value of that asset. Indeed, without that conflict, the definition is comprised
of hollow words.
In the context of family limited partnerships, terms have been misused. By
utilizing the limited partnership shell, liquid assets become illiquid in order
to discount those assets and to pay less transfer tax.
Because limited partnership interests have little, if any, influence on the
activity of a partnership, the valuation of these interests may be significantly
reduced by valuation discounts, such as discounts for lack of control or lack
of marketability. Use of substantial discounts allows estates to minimize
both the value of the reported limited partnership interest and the reported
Federal estate or gift tax liability.172

Moreover, if a seller wanted to maximize her selling price, she would liquidate
the partnership and sell its assets at their full fair market values. 173 Any transfer
of her partnership interest from that standpoint should reflect the value of the
FLPs assets. 174 If the current Regulation inadequately produces that result, the
Regulation needs to be modified so that all of an estate's assets are accurately
valued. A significant amount of revenue is at stake. 175
The estate tax fair market value definition Regulation should be amended
to account for situations where its assumptions do not apply and, therefore,
results in a distortion of value. Currently, there are two income tax loss Regu-

172Eller, supra note 19, at 196.
173Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.c. 478, 495 (2000) (Parr, J., dissenting) ("If a
hypothetical third party had offered to purchase the assets held by the partnership for the full
fair market value of those assets, there is little doubt that decedent could have had the assets
distributed to himself to complete the sale.").
174See id. at 491 (majority op.) ("Approximately 75[%) of the pattnership's value consisted
of cash and securities. It is unlikely and plainly contrary to the interests of a hypothetical seller
to sell these interests separately and without regard to the liquidity of the underlying assets.
SFLP was not a risky business or one in which the continuing value of the assets depended on
continuing operations.").
1751n 2001, although relatively few estate tax returns included limited partnerships, they
represent over a billion dollars in revenue. Eller, supra note 19 at 192 ("For decedents who
died in 2001, only a small fraction, l. 7%, of estates included interests in family limited partnerships, whether operating family businesses or mere estate-planning devices. These 1,880
estates reported almost $l.7 billion in family limited pattnership interests"). With discounts
averaging around 30% to 60%, that is a large revenue loss for what generally amounts to a
slight of hand. See id. at 197.
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lations that deal with the intentional destruction of property and they provide
instruction for the drafting of an exception to the fair market definition in
section 20.2031-1(b). The proposed Regulation should provide that where,
prior to the valuation date, a transferor (donor or decedent) willfully acts to
diminish the value of his property, the property's value must be determined
without reference to those actions. Further, where a donor/decedent creates
an entity such as a family limited partnership and transfers liquid assets such
as cash, cash equivalents, or marketable securities, she will be presumed to
be acting willfully primarily to reduce the value of her estate. Unless she can
prove that those assets were ordinary and necessary for the operation of her
business, their value as part of an entity interest will be ignored and they must
be valued in their pre-diminished, liquid form.
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